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THE HUDSON INSTITUTE

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

**PANEL IV: “THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN
THE NEW WORLD: THE BROTHERHOOD IN EUROPE”**

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HUSAIN HAQQANI: Okay. We are coming up close to 4:00. I think we have to start and finish the last session as quickly as possible. So if you will all kindly take your seats, we will get started.

Thank you very much. I'm Husain Haqqani and I have been assigned the task of conducting this last panel, which is of course last, but not least in importance. We are discussing the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe during this panel, and we have an excellent panel here, some of whom have been working pretty late into the night last night to prepare their presentations to you.

Our first speaker is going to be Ian Johnson. He is the deputy China bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal and he is currently based in Beijing. From 1988-1992, Ian was a freelance correspondent in Berlin for the *Baltimore Sun* and the *St. Petersburg [Florida] Times*. He joined the *Baltimore Sun* in 1992 as New York Bureau chief, and moved to Beijing as bureau chief in 1994. He also was a member of a journal team that won the Overseas Press Club's Forbes Award for business reporting. And he also won a Pulitzer for international reporting in 2001.

Our next speaker is Eric Brown. Eric, of course, is a colleague and a friend and co-editor of the journal *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*. He is part of the Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World. He is also affiliated with Hudson Center for Future Security Strategies, and he's co-director of the Center's global strategy project on political Islam. Eric's writing and research focuses on Islam, security and politics in Asia, and the relationships between China and the Muslim world. He conducts research regularly in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and frequently consults with the U.S. government. He has traveled extensively in Muslim Asia, and has great insights to share with us, both from his travels and his research.

Our third speaker for today is Nasser Khader and he's a member of the Parliament of Denmark for the New Alliance. Until the 7th of May 2007, he represented the Social Liberal Party. He's a leading proponent of peaceful coexistence of democracy and Islam and established a new movement called Moderate Muslims, which he later renamed as Democratic Muslims after the cartoon controversy that started with the Danish newspaper publishing cartoons of the prophet of Islam Prophet Mohammed. And he will also share with us the issues relating to the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.

So, Ian, shall we start with you and your presentation is titled "The History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe."

IAN JOHNSON: Well, such a grand title, but I'm not sure I can deliver the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. In fact, because it's a topic that's probably beyond anyone's capacity currently. However, I'd like to explore some aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood spread across Europe. Organizationally, the Muslim Brotherhood's first actions in Europe were related

to the building of a mosque in Munich. This is the subject of a book that I'm writing that will appear next year. And I'm not going to go into the entire history of this mosque's construction, because it's a little bit off target for today. However, I wanted to sketch out some of the basic facts, because I think it's important background if we're looking at the Muslim Brotherhood spread across Europe.

The mosque in question is the Islamic Center of Munich. It was founded in 1958 by a group of former Muslim soldiers who had served in the Red Army and World War II, had been captured by the Germans and then fought for the Germans. Most of these people, tens of thousands of them returned back to the Soviet Union under the Yalta agreement in 1945 or so, but a few thousand remained in Munich after the war and formed a sizable body, a sizable Muslim population. Don't forget this is Europe pre-Muslim immigration.

The West German government was quite keen to maintain control over this group of Muslims because it saw them as émigrés who when Communism fell would be able to return home and out of thanks support a united Germany's territorial claims east of the Oder-Neisse border. At the same time, U.S. intelligence also had designs on this group of Muslims, thinking that they would be useful talent to send out into the Third World to criticize the Soviet Union. So they were sent often in various covert propaganda missions to distribute leaflets at the Hajj, or to go to conferences and criticize the USSR.

The Germans countered this U.S. operation by recruiting one of the soldiers' wartime imams bringing him to Germany and installing him as head of a Bonn created office the Ecclesiastical Administration of Muslim Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany. The head of this office founded a Mosque Construction Commission with the idea that this mosque project will unite the Muslims in Munich behind him and thus under West German control.

Also invited to participate in the Mosque project – and here we get to the Muslim Brotherhood – were young Arab students studying in Germany at the time. They asked a prominent refugee from Nasser's Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood Said Ramadan, who was living in Geneva, to help them out and be their advocate in Munich. Under Ramadan's guidance, the students essentially kicked out the soldiers and took over the project, turning it into a Muslim Brotherhood mosque. When the Islamic Center of Munich was completed in 1973, it was easily the most important Muslim Brotherhood mosque in Europe or in the West.

For example, the current head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, Mahdi Akef served as chief imam at the mosque for several years in the 1980s. The Mosque Construction Commission eventually became the Islamic community of Germany, which is a founding member of several key Muslim Brotherhood group in Europe. But how did this happen? How did they spread from this one mosque in Munich to a quite ambitious and complete structure across the continent?

I think it's helpful to look at a couple of key people involved in this effort, perhaps clear up some misconceptions about them and allow us to draw some conclusions, identify some trends about how the Muslim Brotherhood is operated in the West. First, I want to focus on Said Ramadan. Said Ramadan married one of Hassan al-Banna's daughters. He was a gifted speaker and was often referred to as the little Banna, who allegedly could recite the master's speeches

word for word. It was his charismatic presence in Munich that galvanized the students to take over the mosque project. His standing in the Muslim world also encouraged the CIA and USIA and other U.S. agencies to back Ramadan, for example, sponsoring his participation in conferences and generally helping him keep up his profile while in exile.

All of these facts explain why Ramadan was important at the very beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood's penetration of Europe, but they do not support the thesis, which is widely found on the internet and other places, that Ramadan was the person who pushed the Muslim Brotherhood across Europe. I think Ramadan's pinnacle of influence came in 1962 when he helped found the Muslim World League. He had worked tirelessly over the previous decade and a half to unite Muslims in a common cause. He had widespread contacts, of course, the Muslim Brotherhood. He knew old style clerics such as the grand mufti of Jerusalem. He had tight relations with the Pakistani group like Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and, of course, Saudi Arabia.

According to one account, it was Ramadan, who personally handed King Saud the official proposal to found the League. But this – as that act showed the Saudis dominated the league from the start, and Ramadan was interested in a transnational organization that would do away with national boundaries. He opposed the Saudis' control and by the mid-1960s had less influence over the movement. Most members, as we've heard already earlier today, most members of the Ikhwan made their peace with the Saudis. The kingdom, of course, was the site of Islam's holiest places. It was rich and had conservative religious strain. Most of the members of the Brotherhood, who were in trouble and who were abroad, made some sort of peace with the Saudis and accepted their money.

So at this time in the early 1960s, the Saudis decided it was time to bring Said Ramadan into the fold. They wanted to make his Islamic center in Geneva its first overseas office and Ramadan refused this, also rejecting league efforts to turn his magazine *Al-Muslimun* into an official league organ. In his letter rejecting the league's offer of money, he signed and dated it with the fictive place name of Islamistan, a sign that he wanted no country to control his work. The Saudis didn't cut their ties with Ramadan initially. He held a Saudi diplomatic passport for a few years, with the title ambassador-at-large for the Muslim World League, but later he would travel on a Pakistani pass and had no more ties with the Saudis.

I think the biggest blow for him and for his prestige in Europe came in Munich. Basically, the students, whom he had helped gain control of this mosque project, turned their back on him, and the Brutus was played by Ramadan's assistant, Ghaleb Himmat. Some fellow students speculate that national identity might have played a role. Himmat was a Syrian; Ramadan was an Egyptian. Syria had a very vibrant branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and its chief Isam al-'Attar was in exile in Europe at the time.

Some of the students, who are still alive who I have had a chance to talk with, said that they thought that Himmat wanted to bring 'Attar to Munich and make him the head of the center. Certainly, Himmat was very interested in the family. He married one of al-'Attar's daughters. But in any case, he turned on Ramadan, and Ramadan went to Munich for the last time in the mid-1960s and after that had nothing further to do with the group. He, of course, was still

somewhat active in the international Muslim movement, but in Europe he didn't play too much of a role.

After Said Ramadan left Munich and had nothing more to do with the center, the Islamic Centre of Munich became increasingly an Arab-only center. A Pakistani chairman of the group was shunned to the side. Even Turkish Gastarbeiter, who were starting to come to Germany in large numbers, were denied membership in the group. The group voted against a 1975 application by the Turks to join, saying that they would hurt the harmonious cooperation of the mosque.

However, one person who was allowed into the group was Youssef Nada, who is the second important person to look at, I think, perhaps more than any other name associated with the mosque or with the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. I think he symbolizes how the Brotherhood has been misunderstood in the West. He was accused after 9/11, of course, of being a terrorist financier, but, to me, his chief impotence is as a master organizer, and a link also between Europe and the Muslim Brotherhood spread in the United States, a topic I won't get into today, but which is quite evident from various historical events that took place.

Nada joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s. He was arrested as a 23-year-old student in the giant 1954 crackdown. He was released and worked in the family dairy business. In 1960, he obtained an exit visa and went to Austria to study cheese-making technology, which he hoped to bring back to Egypt. He saw a market opening from Emmentaler cheese and went to Graz to study its manufacture. So it's not exactly the sexiest start for Islamic radical, but such are the fortunes of business, I guess. (Laughter.)

So he arrives in Austria. He goes during a Ramadan holiday up to Munich and meets Himmat. His cheese business doesn't do very well, but he has increasingly close ties with Tripoli, and he became close to the court and got a concession exporting building materials from Austria to Libya. Like most of Nada's successful business ventures, it was a quasi-monopoly, one that required good contacts, but little real business savvy.

And after the 1969 coup, Nada's contacts evaporated. He says he had a nervous breakdown, was smuggled out of the country and went to a clinic in Wiesbaden for treatment. He became extremely close with Himmat and went to Campione d'Italia, an Italian enclave in Switzerland, where he bought a house and set up business. The two became inseparable. Himmat asked Nada to join the Islamic Society of Southern Germany, which was the new name for the Mosque Construction Commission. Himmat also moved up to Campione, and when the mosque governing council met again in 1973, Said Ramadan was officially kicked out of the group and Nada voted in support of the action.

The decision by Himmat and Nada to keep close control over the leadership of the mosque makes sense in hindsight. The 1970s was a fertile period for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups. They were reorganizing after years of banishment and imprisonment. The West with its freedoms and strong financial and legal systems was an ideal place to put the movement back together. Plus, of course, millions of Muslims had been emigrating to the West. Europe and North America were no longer fringe places in the Muslim world.

A few months after taking control of the Munich mosque, Himmat attended a key meeting in London. This is 1973. It was probably the first Europe-wide meeting of Muslim leaders sympathetic to goals of political Islam. It was held in London's theatre district and the meeting was called "The Islamic Cultural Centers and Bodies in Europe." Their stated goal, at least, was to set up a network of likeminded groups that could promote their vision of Islam. And Saudi Arabia, again, played a key role. It financed the meetings and a Saudi was the chairman of the group. Himmat was elected to its governing council.

Another person who joined this group at the same time was Khurshid Ahmad, a Pakistani activist with Jama'ah al-Islamiyah. Ahmad's founded the Islamic Foundation in London, which later moved to the village of Markfield outside of Leicester. So the meeting did not create a network for the Muslim Brotherhood, but I think it was a signpost on the road. It illustrates an important point. That creating this network of political Islam in the West, at least, was the result of years and decades really of determination and persistence and planning. It did not happen overnight, and in my view, there is no master plan despite some claims to the contrary. It was a vision that was vigorously pursued by a core group of people over many years.

Another interesting aspect of that meeting, though, which I think is also indicative for the future of the movement is that the ethnic divisions began to blur. Ahmad, Khurshid Ahmad, for example, joined the governing board of the Munich mosque in 1982. Just a few years earlier, the group had carefully tweaked its statutes to keep out the Turkish guest workers. Now, a Pakistani was allowed in to the governing council. And of course, then a couple of years after that the Munich mosque became the refuge for Mahdi Akef. I could go into Akef a little bit more, but I think I'm running out of time, so –

Yes, I also wanted to say very briefly. We've probably all heard something about the Bank Al Taqwa which was one of Nada's main business creations in the 1980s. It was widely accused of being a bank that financed terrorism. Another one of these charges that's never been proven, certainly not enough to charge him or take him to court. But I think that another way of looking at how he and other treated the Brotherhood was as a way of building his business, much as East-Asian World uses *guanxi* connections. I think the Muslim Brotherhood is often very closely tied up among these people in business and not just in religious power.

Shortly after Akef left, the body had its final success in setting up a structure which exists today. In 1989, the group helped found the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, along arguably with the most influential groups in France and Britain. It founded the federation in classic Muslim Brotherhood fashion, as an umbrella group that could set up other bodies dedicated to the movement's long-term goals of education, financing and lobbying.

In 1990, the federation set up the Institute for the Study of Human Sciences, which was designed to train imams and elites. In 1997, it set up a fatwa council to provide religious guidance to European Muslims. It also set up a trust company to raise money, and the federation itself became a lobbying group that has had meetings in contact with the Vatican and the European Union. Today, it has branches in two dozen European countries. It is the only pan-European Muslim organization able to lobby effectively across the continent.

To me, this is the true fulfillment of the Muslim Brotherhood's tentative steps in Munich in the 1950s and '60s. To me, it's not really terrorism, although the Brotherhood has endorsed terrorism over the years and continues to do so in the Middle East. Its legacy here in the West has been to push a narrower version of Islam across the continent, regardless of context. Its ignorance, whether purposeful or not of issues such as anti-Semitism, has hindered integration of Muslims in Europe.

I don't think it is necessarily a terrorist group, but it creates the milieu where terrorists can form. The "us versus them" mentality, the victimization mentality that is the bedrock of extremism and violence. Western authorities, to me, have been slow to see this aspect of the Brotherhood. When the September 11th attacks took place, the U.S. government swung hard against the Brotherhood calling them terrorists. Nada and Himmat were put on a list of terrorist financiers. The list was endorsed by the United Nations. Both men's bank accounts were frozen – remain frozen today, even though Swiss prosecutors, despite extensive help by the U.S. counterparts and private organizations have been unable to pin any charges on the two.

These draconian charges and allegations, I think, have ended up helping the movement. With terrorism charges so far unproven in a court of law, the Brotherhood in the West has been among – in some people's eyes exonerated. Just like in the 1950s, the West's repulsion with the Brotherhood is now turning, in some corners, to infatuation. For a while terrorists, they are now seen as savvy organizers, a new secret weapon to deploy in an effort to control Muslims in the West.

So with that, I'll stop. (Applause.)

MR. HAQQANI: Perfect. Eric?

ERIC BROWN: One of the central conceits of Salafism—or at least, of that particular strain of Salafist political theology that has infused the Muslim Brotherhood movement and spurred on its worldwide spread over the last eighty years—is the belief that the *Umma*, or the Muslim Nation, is engaged in an existential struggle with the modern West.

That view derives in part on the belief that God originally revealed Islam to Muhammad so that his Nation would be the most powerful over the whole of the earth—or, as the early modern revivalist Afghani had put it, Islam was revealed so that the Muslims would be "the cream of Adam's children, and the master's of mankind."

But at some point along the line, as the Salafist version of events tells it, Muslims failed to take their religion seriously, and had lost their way—and with that, they had lost God's blessings.

With time, the Muslim Nation, which was once unified and mightier than all other nations, became spiritually polluted and internally fractured. Come the modern era, the Nation found itself helpless to resist the conquest of its lands by a rising West. That was not simply a military conquest. It also introduced modern Western ideas about materialism and secular government which the Salafists argued had beguiled the entire Muslim populations to strive and

further away from their true religion, and which left the Muslim nation enfeebled and shackled within a modern reality of false ideas and nation states that was not of its own making. From the Salafist point of view, this Western-derived modernity was illegitimate, inauthentic, and entirely unacceptable. For as long as this modernist civilization helped sway over the hearts and minds of Muslims, the Muslim nation would be divided against itself, rife with internal turmoil, ideologically and organizationally too weak to resist the West, and ultimately humiliated.

Hassan al Banna, among others, argued that for Muslims to passively accept this sorry state of affairs would be a sin against God. It followed that the Islamic struggle, the Islamic Jihad as he expressly called it, to drive modernist civilization from Islamic lands and to return the Muslim nation to its original wholeness and power was an obligation placed on all Muslims by God and the best and only way for them to secure God's blessings once again.

Muslim Brotherhood's founding purpose and still its guiding principle today has been to operationalize this civilizational Jihad, to provide a vehicle that is for awakening each and every Muslim individual, every family and society to their neglected duties, and to integrating them into a collective struggle to overturn modern civilization to create a truly Islamic state that would implement Islam comprehensively in all spheres of human activity and thought. Only then will the Muslim nation be strong and whole again.

Al Banna believed that his revolution would take only three generations, as he said, one to listen, one to fight, and one to win. Clearly he was no prophet, and the united and powerful Muslim nation he so desired to bring about, or rather return to, is nowhere closer to being a reality today than it was when he founded the Islamic Movement. But there is no doubt about the power of the idea and of the movement that he had unleashed or about the large and apparently growing pool of people who believe that the return of the nation is imminent or at least inevitable. And there can also be no doubt that the various efforts to hasten this Muslim nation back to its original wholeness had been one of the many sources of the hostilities and violence that has plagued the modern Muslim world, especially in the Middle East.

Over the years, the Islamic Movement has exhibited a tremendous internal dynamism which owes in part to the diversity of ideas and strategies that – (unintelligible) – have devised to make the Muslim nation whole again. As we know, al Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11th in an effort to awaken what it saw as a slumbering Muslim nation and to make this nation whole again so that it might wage total war against the West. Only a few years after, Qaeda's field commander in Iraq, Zarqawi, struggled to create a small Islamic state that might inspire the formation of like-minded states elsewhere by fighting with Shiites who represent from the radical Sunni perspective the very first division that destroyed the original unity of the Muslim community. The Brotherhood, as it is spread around the world, has also adopted a range of strategies to awaken the Muslim nation. It has struggled, for instance, against the State of Israel which it portrays as a modern satanic conspiracy against the nation's original wholeness.

Similarly, in the early '70s, the Brotherhood's South Asian cousin, the Jamaat-e-Islami, helped West Pakistan's armies to implement a near genocidal campaign against Bengalis in the belief that Bangladesh's independence represented a further slip away from the nation's original unity which God had enjoined.

As the Brotherhood ideology has spread around the globe, it has shown itself to be flexible enough to adapt itself to local conditions. The most apparent expression of this in recent years is the rise of Islamic political parties, which from a strictly Salafist point of view are forbidden, but according to the Brotherhood now okay. The general assumption amongst many Western analysts is that this turn to politics might moderate the Brotherhood's radicalism over time insofar as it will force Brotherhood members to deal with everyday political issues rather than seek the struggle for the Muslim nation with all that entails. But at several points in its history, the Brotherhood has experienced similar fragmentation and this in turn has triggered an internationalist effort within the Brotherhood as a whole to draw all of its branches around the world together and to unify them. Today is no exception. In fact, I think we are witnessing a Brotherhood-driven effort to awaken the Muslim nation that is historically unprecedented in terms of its scale and ambition. This particular effort is not being organized in Cairo or in the Hindu Kush, or from anywhere else in what we would consider the Muslim world proper. Despite this, it surely concerns the whole of the Muslim world.

If we were forced to identify one location on the map, the effort is being organized and launched from Dublin, Ireland. The grand strategist of this international effort, though certainly not its only key architect, is Sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi, the Egyptian born and Qatar based cleric. Qaradawi was once tapped to head the Egyptian Brotherhood, but turned that job down as he had better things to do. Today he's connected, substantially I should add, to a vast empire of research and educational institutes, financial institutions and enterprises and media outfits, including his own website which offers religious guidance on all manner of affairs in the enormously popular website Islam Online. He also makes weekly appearances on international television like Al Jazeera. He has been described as the world's first virtual caliph.

Two organizations both founded and chaired by Qaradawi should be of particular concern to us. The first is the European Council for Fatwa and Research. Founded in 1997, the council describes itself as the preeminent Sharia authority for all of Europe's Muslims. The second institution is the World Association of Muslim Clerics, which was founded in 2004 and chaired by Qaradawi. Its makeup is unique as it includes Muslim scholars from all over the Muslim world, and interestingly it includes Shiites, which makes it an ecumenical anomaly. The World Association of Clerics claims, quite presumptuously, I should say, and certainly not without controversy and resistance, to be the primary religious authority for the whole of the world's Muslim community.

Now, both of these Sharia councils which are dominated by Brotherhood scholars have provided Sharia-based justification for terrorism against Israel and against American soldiers and allied forces in Iraq. They have, at the same time, condemned terrorism against targets in Europe and North America. Moreover, they have also urged European Muslims to integrate into European society, to vote and be politically active, to acquire graduate degrees, and to adopt the conciliatory approach toward non-Muslims that stresses dialogue. And they have ruled that democracy and political freedom are, on the basis of Sharia, perfectly acceptable for Muslims all over the world, and that in fact Muslims should pursue them both. What does all this mean?

Does it mean that some people have argued that a uniquely European form of Brotherhood ideology is developed and that, moreover, it is moderate and committed to democracy? What can we say about how the experience of the Brotherhood in European democratic context, in the New World that is, has impacted the Brotherhood's ideology? After all, hasn't it been the Europe-based Brothers, such as Qaradawi, Faisal al Mawlawi, Rashid Ghannouchi, all scholars at the European Council for Fatwa and Research that have pioneered the Brotherhood's adoption of democracy and exported it to the larger world?

Europe had, of course, figured prominently in the Brotherhood's plans since the movement's beginning. Al Banna himself believed that the Muslim nation would one day launch a counteroffensive to emancipate the West from its own sinister modernity and that the Islamic Movement would, as he wrote, "pursue the evil force of modernist civilization to its own lands invade its Western heartland, and struggle to overcome it until all the world shouts by the name of the Prophet and teachings of Islam are spread throughout the world." Due to a number of historical reasons, including the iron fist of Nasser's Egypt that drove the Brothers out of their homeland to establish its first outpost in Europe in the '50s, as well as the waves of Muslim immigration to Europe following World War II, the Brotherhood's counteroffensive was launched much earlier than anyone ever anticipated.

In the '60s, Western Europe emerged as a sort of frontier land in the Islamist imagination. Living on this frontier was seen as inherently very risky for Muslims, especially because they were living in the belly of Satan as it were, and they were exposed to all sorts of bad ideas that might draw them away from their faith. Revivalist movements, such as the Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami began to stress the importance of sending missionaries to Western Europe in order to preach amongst these Muslim communities, so that they might preserve their Islamic identity and not being absorbed into sin.

The missionaries sent to Europe to settle this frontier no doubt drew inspiration from thinkers like Sayyid Qutb whose blanket application of *jahiliyya* to the modern age tended, I think, to actually erode the classical Arabic distinctions between Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam. The ideas of Qutb's main inspiration, the South Asian revivalists like Maududi also played a big role, especially their ideas about how the Islamic struggle within Islam was a global one and that Islam in essence was a universal religion that required the nation of the faithful to bring the whole earth under its sway.

Sheikh Qaradawi in 1991, in a book entitled *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, was one of the first Islamists to begin to see Muslims living in the West not simply as frontiersmen, but also as a strategic asset for the Islamic Movement that might play an important role in the global Islamic revival. Qaradawi believed that by organizing the Muslim communities in the West and by reminding them of their obligations to the Muslim nation, that they would be able to launch the counteroffensive against what he saw as the West cultural invasion of the Muslim world. As he has argued on so many occasions, Western Muslims could directly challenge Christianity, secularism, liberalism, and modernity in general in their own heartlands. Though these efforts, Qaradawi has famously said Muslims would eventually reconquer Europe through preaching an ideology.

There are many aspects to this effort. We might discuss them in greater detail later, but the key dimension of the Brotherhood's counteroffensive in Europe, as it has been – as it has been in other parts of the world, has been its *dawa*, the missionary work and its tarbia, or educational activity, designed to awaken Muslims to what they call authentic Islam. The concept of authentic Islam has been formulated in many different ways by different Brotherhood thinkers, but most tend to stress that it means most of all what al Banna had described as a sincere faith when that was characterized by the absence of all worldly attachments, ideologies, and principles, as well as the knowledge that Islam was highest of all. “Only with this resoluteness,” Banna had written, “can Muslims become soldiers of the ideology and the belief, rather than soldiers for worldly purposes.”

As a general observation, I think questions of sincere faith or right ideology are increasingly common in the Muslim political religious life around the world thanks largely to the Brotherhood's global effort to spread these concepts. Right ideology hasn't always been the concern of the world's Muslims, or at least not the primary one. As but one example, opposite to Europe, way on the other side of the Eurasian world island, Indonesian Muslims say that the Brotherhood's campaign to purify Islam in their society has introduced a Takfiri culture which has produced increasingly acrimonious disputes over who is a better Muslim between those who have succumbed to the Brotherhood ideology and those that adhere to Indonesia century old Islamic traditions, which, in contrast to Arab Salafism, are much more open to pluralism.

Fortunately for Indonesians, they recognized these Salafist concepts not simply as foreign but as dangerous, and they've been able to muster an ideas-based immune response that has contributed to a counter-movement against the Brotherhood. But the situation in Europe, and I should say for the West in general, is showing itself to be another matter entirely. That likely has something to do with the fact that Europe's Muslims, especially those of the second, third, and now fourth generations, lack the attachment to their parents' religious traditions, not to mention any real attachments to their countries. Amongst these people, Brotherhood ideologues, it would seem, have a ripe audience to which to deliver their religious call and ideas about authentic Islam.

I'd like to speak briefly about one seminal Brotherhood text about authentic Islam that is addressed to European Muslims. The book is entitled, appropriately, *To Be a Muslim*, and it was written by a former youth organizer in France named Fathi Yakan mentioned earlier, who was part of the Brotherhood's old guard, and he was described on the IOL, the Islam Online website, as being a prominent Islamic scholar and caller.

I mention the book because it was recently recommended on Islam Online by a youth counselor who said that it was a good educational tool for Muslim youths. The book is divided into two parts. The first describes what a Muslim should believe and think and the importance of sincere belief and right ideology. The second half of the booklet states more broadly that a Muslim's faith is best lived through involvement in the Islamic Movement. To not be an activist, in fact, is sinful in God's eyes. “True commitment to Islam,” Yakan writes, “requires every Muslim to dedicate his or her life in a Jihad to establish and maintain a system of Islamic governance.”

Now, Yakan's book offers a menu of Jihad activities for young Muslims, from community organizing to charitable work to calling others back to their faith. There leaves little doubt that fighting and dying in the way of Allah is the noblest calling. Revealingly, Yakan has recently praised Osama bin Laden for his faithfulness and sincere commitment to Jihad and the elevation of the word of Allah.

Statements from esteemed brothers such as this, not to mention the endorsement to callers like Sheikh Yakan have received on ordinary websites like Islam Online from youth counselors nonetheless, should certainly shake whatever confidence policymakers in the counter-terrorism community might have in the Western social scientific minds' ability to devise hard and fast categories for distinguishing between Jihad groups and so-called non-Jihad groups. If anything, hard Islamism and soft Islamism exists on a continuum. Disagreements between two poles over the legitimacy of armed Jihad are more often than not related to strategy and tactics, not to religious principle. But the distinction, however, has been entirely welcomed by Brotherhood activists who have condemned the attacks of September 11, Madrid, and London. In fact, Brotherhood activists have volunteered to join the fight against terrorism in Europe.

Take, for example, Kamal Helbawy, the one-time chief European spokesman for the Brotherhood and founder in '97 of the Muslim Association of Britain. In the wake of the London bombings, he proposed the construction of treatment centers or houses of extremists where young people who have been exposed to al Qaedaism could be ideologically rehabilitated. The offer should be greeted with suspicion, or better, outrage, by anyone familiar with Helbawy's own work, with that of his associates of the Muslim Association of Britain, including Azzam Tamimi. His most recent book *Hamas: A History from Within*, should impart some clue about his personal story in politics. "For us Muslims," Tamimi once wrote in an appearance as a guest scholar on a Q&A forum on Islam Online, "martyrdom is not the end of things, but the beginning of the most wonderful of things."

Helbawy and the other Brotherhood scholars evidently don't consider this particular pathway toward martyrdom sick. When asked about what he thought about Tony Blair's assertion that suicide bombing is wrong everywhere, Helbawy exclaimed, "Well, he is wrong. It is as simple as that. He is not a Mufti. He is a British statesman." What this statement implies obviously is that God or at least the Islamic jurists from the Muslim nation, as they understand him, are the final arbiters in the question of whether violence is legitimate or not, not European democracy. But I think people sometimes fail to grasp the full significance of this religious principle. Even though well informed about the Brotherhood or about Salafi Jihadism they say that they source of their grievances and hatred is primarily not religious but political and that their ideology is akin to fascism. The comparison is not completely off the mark considering the resemblances, but I tend to think our failure to understand this religious principle was partly, if not mainly, due to our own success or at least to the success of our liberal democratic traditions. The genius of liberal democracy, of course, was to devise a political order in which religiously-inspired violence which ravaged European civilization for centuries could be considered a thing of the past, but clearly radical Islam shows that we have not escaped that history.

Mohammed Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the July 7 attacks on London, expressed this most clearly in his posthumously released martyrdom video. Khan had a lot to say about his

particular grievances over British foreign policies. And the British press soon after seized upon this with the Brotherhood and its sympathizers defending the reasonableness of his views, though not his actions. But what was in the main mist and the public clamor to understand that ensued was the fact that Khan's enthusiasm for enlisting, as he put it, "as a soldier in the Islamic army," wasn't simply a matter of a grievance, but a retaliatory act against British democracy that was rooted in desire to fulfill an obligation that he believed that's been placed upon him uniquely by God. As he said, and this here is al Banna perfected, "I and dozens like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam, which is obedience to the one true God, Allah, and to follow in the footsteps the final prophet and the messenger Mohammed. This is how our ethical stances are dictated."

Khan's last testament poses radical Islam's challenge to liberal democracy in very stark terms. Does fidelity too and sincere belief in Islam forbid a Muslim, as Khan implicitly suggests, from organizing his or her life peacefully and democratically? The Brotherhood would certainly have us believe that there is an alternative, and that it is theirs. They have, unlike their Salafi Jihadi cousins, adopted a conciliatory approach to the West, one that is, as we are often told, pragmatic and moderate. And they have tried to position themselves as the moderate face of mainstream modernizing Islam that we, liberal democrats, should dialogue with. But we might pose the question back to them differently; that is, to avoid seeding the terms of this discussion to the Brotherhood, the question might also be put in another way, with a view toward the requirements of our own liberal democracies. Does adherence to Islam permit Muslims to live as citizens in a non-Muslim democratic society and to organize their lives, their manner of worship, their communities, and their politics in a manner consistent with democratic principles and their future preservation?

If Islam does not permit this, then we can expect Muslims will simulate to Western democracy just like any other minority. But if it is not required, then Muslims will continue to struggle against Western liberal democracy and it is safe to assume the religious duty of violent Jihad, where at a bear minimum communal sedition will remain in their eyes a religiously legitimate, if not honorable and obligatory, Muslim calling. At the outset, as everyone knows or as has been widely repeated, there are many Muslims who simply don't feel a conflict between their faith and liberal democratic life. But at the same time, the traditions of Islam place a big question mark over where Muslims should actually stand on these issues. This derives mainly from the fact that the Muslims' experience with liberal democracy is very limited, as well as from the historically unique position of Muslims being a political minority.

The late Dr. Zaki Badawi, president of the Muslim College of London, had said "Muslim jurists, theologians, have always expounded Islam as both the as both a government and a faith. This reflects the fact that Muslims from the start lived under their own law. Muslim theologians naturally produced a theology with this in view. It is a theology of the majority. Being a minority was not seriously considered or even contemplated. Muslim theology offers up to the present no systematic formulation of the status of being in a minority. That question's being examined." That these questions are being examined is certainly understandable, but the problem is not from the question, but the fact of who is answering them.

This brings me back to Qaradawi and company. The European Fatwa Council employs a special form of jurisprudence or Islamic Fiqh that is designed to address the novel needs of Muslims living in the West. There are many aspects to this Fiqh, but the gist of it is that it is permissible on the basis of Sharia law for Muslims to postpone the full implementation of Sharia, including and especially aspects of the Sharia that the democratic majority would not tolerate, such as, for example, the corporal punishments for sins like adultery. This jurisprudence doesn't propose that a Muslim abandon or abrogate the Sharia, as that would be to commit apostasy, the gravest of Islamic sins. Rather, it says that it is legitimate to postpone those punishments so that Muslims could work peacefully and freely within European society to fulfill their obligations to the wider Muslim nation which includes domestically the formation of Islamic micro-states within Europe that are governed by Sharia. Their foreign obligations, as we know, are saturated with the ideology of terror.

This Fiqh derives from a decision that was made back in the early '80s, and in fact it was expressed in Qaradawi's book in 1991, the priorities book. Qaradawi made a startling observation that sent unsettling shockwaves throughout the Islamic Movement, as he wrote, "a closer look at the history of the Muslim nation and the Islamic Movement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamic idea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere of democracy and freedom." He elaborated his argument even further, but let me summarize. Democracy and political freedom are Islamically legitimate, even necessary, for the Islamist Movement because it is good for the Muslim nation. That idea, incidentally, was extrapolated further by Islamist scholars in the 1990s as they argued that Western democracies were already two-thirds an Islamic state and that all that was left was to convert everyone to Islam.

This (land grab?) the Brotherhood's adoption of this democratic strategy, has put it in conflict with other Islamic trends on at least two different fronts. The first with al Qaeda is well known, and with Salafi movement such as Hizb ut-Tahrir who have said that this is a European Fiqh and it consisted abrogation of the Sharia. This has put the Brotherhood's ideologues in a position where they have to – have needed to argue that their civilizational Jihad, this time carried on by democratic means, is preferable to and good for the Islamic nation rather than armed Jihad. Their ability to make that argument depends obviously both on how the Jihadists perform, as well as what their struggle actually bears, what fruits their struggle actually bears. And here is where I think it gets tricky for the Brothers, at least for those operating in the liberal democratic West.

They eagerly seek political freedom, but they absolutely resist religious freedom, which is the basic right and requirement of all liberal democracies as this can lead to apostasy. As Qaradawi has said, "the gravest danger facing the Muslim is the one that threatens his spiritual existence, i.e., that threatens its belief; therefore, apostasy or unbelief after having been a Muslim is the greatest danger to society. For Muslim society to preserve its existence, it must struggle against apostasy from every source and in all its forms, and it must not let it spread like wildfire in a field of apostasy so that it will not worsen and its sparks scatter becoming group apostasy. Thus the Muslim sages agree that the punishment for the apostate is execution." In other words, you can't defect from the Muslim nation. Defection from Islam or whatever the Brothers

construe in their lofty positions on the European Sharia Councils to be Islam, is punishable by death.

Now, if the Brotherhood were empowered in say Egypt, it might actually be able to enforce this punishment. But how in the liberal democratic context in the absence of the threat of corporal punishment can this be enforced?

As I said earlier, the World Association of Muslim Clerics was founded to be the world's leading Sharia authority. Qaradawi has said that the goal of this project is to preserve the identity of the Islamic nation and its essential entity, to protect it against the attacks that seek to tear it from its roots, and change the identity of the nation and turn it into a different nation with a different philosophy that will make it merely a tail, while Allah has created it to be the head. Make it a nation in vassalage to others, while its destiny is to be followed by others and to preserve the message of the nation and its true Islamic face and to counter the destructive currents that want to change the identity of the nation.

Can the Islamic Movement maintain its ideological integrity and its ability to awaken the Muslim nation under liberal democratic conditions? If they find that they are unable to, then perhaps they will find that democracy will not in fact enable them to carry on their Islamic struggle against our way of life. If that is the case, then I see no reason why the hardliners among them, and they are in the majority, won't take to assassinating so-called Muslim apostates on European and American streets. In such a scenario, I also don't see why, given their ideological commitments, that they would not abandon their democracy strategy and as well drop the façade of moderation and peacefulness entirely. If that's the case, the wars of religion being fought all over the Islamic world today will surely come home to the West.

More optimistically, the Brotherhood's democracy strategy strikes me I think as a big wager, at least in a liberal democratic context. That is because freedom of religion is the most basic requirement of liberal democracy, and so long as we liberal democrats conserve it and defend it and not indulge the Islamists, it will remain one, but the recent abandonment of – (unintelligible) – suggests that we might not always do the right thing. If we do, then perhaps we will succeed finally in emancipating our own lands from the Muslim Brotherhood. (Applause.)

MR. HAQQANI: Thank you very much, Eric. Our final speaker for today, Nasser Khader.

NASSER KHADER: Thank you to the Hudson Institute for inviting me to the United States. I'm always happy to be here, and when I go back to Denmark I'm always very inspired.

When I was here in April, in the spring, I was so inspired that a few days later I formed a new party, center party in Denmark, called the New Alliance. It is the first time in 15 years a new party has been formed in Denmark. If it hadn't been for the crisis, there might not have been a new alliance, but it's a party for all the Danish people. According to the latest polls, the party stands to have the final say as to whether the prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, will continue as prime minister or not.

I had actually been thinking about forming a new party or leaving my former party for quite some time. The reasons for leaving my old party were many, but I had in a long time been frustrated over the naivety among my fellow party members, especially during the cartoon crisis. A lot of them condemned the newspaper for printing the cartoons, but had a hard time condemning the overreaction to the cartoons in the Middle East.

My former party represents typical European intellectual cultural relativism and naïveté at its worst. Their general view is something like this: All views are equal. In the '80s and '90s, I used to share that view, but I don't anymore.

Today cultural relativism is an aversion of mine. I find it old-fashioned and naive. Many years ago, those kind of people I called "*halal* hippies." I don't think that all values are equal. Some values are better than others. The democratic values will for me always stand over other values. To me democracy comes before religion because democracy includes people of all kind. Religion and culture has a tendency to exclude people who have a different view or lifestyle.

In Denmark they call me a democratic fundamentalist, which I'm actually very proud of. I even got "Democracy" tattooed in Arabic on my arm. (Laughter.) Especially when it comes to the fundamental democratic rights such as personal freedom and the right to decide over your own life, body, and future. My old party minimized the problems with the Brotherhood in Denmark and in the world. Their view was that if we speak out loudly about the problems with the Brotherhood, we will support the right wing's point of view.

The naives did not and will not differentiate between Islam as a religion and Islamism. They have accepted the Brotherhood's point that there is only one Islam, the Brotherhood's Islam.

The last straw in my process of leaving the party was actually something that happened back home in Denmark while I was in the United States in the spring. At that time, we had a tough debate in Denmark about the Muslim headscarf, especially whether or not it is okay to sexualize little girls and force them to wear a headscarf and clothes which limits their freedom of movement. And to make the point that all values are equal, one of my then fellow colleagues of the old party, a former minister of culture in Denmark, put on a headscarf as a gesture in solidarity with Muslim women who wear head scarf and *hijab*. It was an expensive designer scarf with the words "speak up" written on it. She even let herself be interviewed together with one of Copenhagen's tourist attractions, a fish seller woman who also wears a scarf as a part of her work.

I was furious. For me this issue was not about selling fish. Why show solidarity with those who feel that women cover up, that women are not equal to men. I'm not in favor of banning the headscarf, but – my mother wears one, but she chose it on her own. She chose to start wearing a headscarf about 10 years ago. Many women choose it freely, and it doesn't bother me, but there are also many women who are not allowed to decide for themselves. Even little girls not more than six years old are forced to wear the headscarf. So what my now-former colleagues did was to give the Brotherhood and other conservatives a legitimacy they do not

deserve. Afterwards, they could say to their young daughters, “so there you can see a former minister of culture agrees with us.”

So I left the party headshaking that we in Denmark had not learned anything from the cartoon crisis just a year before.

I know I sat here in Washington in the spring and said one of the most positive result of the cartoon crisis in Denmark was that it was no longer possible for the Danish people to see the Muslims as one group. The cartoon crisis was an eye opener for many Danish people. The cartoon crisis showed that you have different kind of Muslims. I still believe that the foundation of the organization Democratic Muslims in Denmark and other European countries was a cornerstone in that walk. Forming the organization Democratic Muslims was very necessary to organize those Muslims who didn't agree with the Brotherhood.

I believe that religion should never be mixed with politics, and I believe that you shouldn't organize on the basis of ethnic or religious background. But since many of us mainstream Muslims felt our religion hijacked by the Brotherhood, it was a necessary step to organize the organization Democratic Muslims.

In Denmark and other European countries there is a tendency towards public opinion giving those who exaggerate elements in their religion monopoly on the whole religion. People like me who doesn't flaunt their religion are considered not to be real Muslims. It is important that Democratic Muslims organize all over the world because the Brotherhood is good at organizing all over the world, also in Denmark. I do, however, think that Brotherhood might be stronger relatively in West European than in the Muslims countries.

I recently had a meeting with the Moroccan ambassador to Denmark. I asked her why so many Moroccans were involved in terror actions in the West, the bombs in Madrid in Spain, the man who killed Theo van Gogh in Holland – he was also from Morocco – and one of the famous men in Denmark who was sentenced for influencing young people to terror – he was originally from Denmark – his name is Said Mansour. And in the last three years, the Danish security services have thrice sentenced young people who were influenced by Said Mansour and people like him. I asked the ambassador of Morocco why have we terror actions from people who originate from Morocco. She replied, “We haven't any more left from the Brotherhood in Morocco. We captured some of them and put them in the prison. The rest fled to the West.”

Up until a few years ago very liberal immigration rules in Western Europe created a back door for the Brotherhood to organize themselves in Europe. Western Europe has been hopelessly naive to the Brotherhood. It is only recently we in Denmark suggested a bill allowing convicted terrorists with foreign background to be expelled from Denmark.

What characterized the Brotherhood in Denmark and the Scandinavian countries then? They are troublemakers, some more than others. It is interesting to note that during the cartoon crisis in Denmark only 10 imams out of 120 imams we have in Denmark, only 10 of them were active during the crisis. It was people like Abu Laban who were very well connected with the Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohamed al Barazi, highly connected with the Brotherhood in Syria, Abu

Basha (ph) highly connected with the Brotherhood in Lebanon, Hilhal, who has now returned to Lebanon and has been promoted by the Brotherhood there because of his role in the cartoon crisis. Their aim in Denmark, as it is everywhere else, is to monopolize Islam, to take a monopoly on teaching books, building schools and mosques, all in all to get as strong and influential as possible.

What very few know is that the imams who went to the Middle East to show the cartoons also went there to collect money for their schools and mosques from the Middle East.

Sadly, in Denmark and in the West Europe the Brotherhood is being helped by some useful idiots. We have a few of those in Denmark. A useful idiot is someone who with the best but totally misunderstood intentions give legitimacy to the Brotherhood by consulting with them, inviting them to the important meetings and events, and all in all treat them as if they represent all the Muslims in Denmark, but they do not. Until the cartoon crisis, the Danish government used to use the Brotherhood's imam as advisors on integration. But it's not only the Danish government who are useful idiots.

Last week I was sad to learn that the United States ambassador in Denmark, James P. Cain, last week joined the corps of useful idiots in Denmark. (Laughter.) He invited several Danish members of the Brotherhood to the ambassador's residence. For instance, a well known – he invited a well-known denier of Holocaust. She's an Islamist. Her name is Safia Aoude, known to be connected with the Brotherhood. She was excluded from the Conservative People Party in Denmark for exactly the same reasons. He also invited Mohamed al Barazi. He was one of the most active imams during the cartoon crisis. He was the one who lied on Arabic television Al Jazeera and told how the Danish would burn the Quran, which led to even more riots in the Middle East. He also got what he came for, legitimacy in the residency at the U.S. embassy. And there were several other examples like that on the case.

The U.S. ambassador did not invite the Democratic Muslims, as if we do not celebrate the Ramadan because we are democratic. The embassy afterwards told the press when the criticism started, "We are in dialogue," but correct me if I'm wrong, I have never heard George Bush inviting deniers of Holocaust or even the Ku Klux Klan to dinner in the White House for dialogue.

Do I think that we shouldn't have any dialogue with these people? No. We can listen to what they have to say, but some useful idiots seem to think that dialogue means to lie flat on your stomach for their own democratic ideas.

I cannot understand why people, the media, government, even ambassadors, can have such a short memory. How can they forget? I remember every inch of the Danish flag being burned in the Middle East. I remember every picture of rioters burning down the Danish embassy in Damascus. I remember the Danish imams traveling to the Middle East, telling lies about the cartoons and how the Danish mistreat the Muslims in Denmark. And I remember that more than 100 people died as a consequence of the crisis.

It is important to note that the biggest clash of civilization isn't between Islam and the West; it is between democratic-oriented Muslims and the Brotherhood. It is a battle about

conquering Muslim souls. And it is a battle fought with harsh means by the Muslim Brotherhood. And that is one of my points. The Brotherhood's main enemy is not the Jews or the Christians, but Muslims who want democracy, modernity, and reformation. That is where the real battle is. And the Brotherhood will win if the rest of the society keeps getting these amnesia attacks. The greatest challenge for democratic Muslims in Denmark and all over the world is to cure the amnesia by constantly taking a stand in the debate, constantly letting their voices be heard. If they don't, the only thing we will hear in the future is the voices of the Brotherhood, and the useful idiots will be clapping. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. HAQQANI: We have to clear this room at 5:15, which leaves very little time for questions and answers. So only those questions that you think have not been answered and need an immediate and urgent answer. Yes, sir.

Q: Michael Allen, National Endowment for Democracy, somebody who lived for 10 years literally in the shadow of Abu Hamza's Finsbury Park mosque. This is a subject close to my heart. But my question is really, earlier in the summer after the attack on Glasgow airport, Prime Minister Gordon Brown made a security statement to the House of Commons in which he outlined the threat as he saw it, quote, "was violent extremism whatever its source," end quote. He then went out – on to outline a number of measures such as the need to train British-based imams, to establish curricula for British based madrasas, to establish a British Arabic channel for the BBC, and so on and so forth, without of course once mentioning radical Islam, Jihadist Islam. He then went on to outline the need for a (battle?) of ideas. And my question is really, how can one conduct a (battle?) of ideas – how does one conduct a (battle?) of ideas without identifying the ideological enemy that one is confronting?

And related to that, I wonder if the panel had any views on – we heard earlier about Husain's book *The Islamists*. There seems to be this new generation emerging, maybe only a few people emerging, former radicals who at least have the potential to be, well, like the generation of dissident communists, the failed generation that became salient important warriors in the cultural cold war against Soviet communism, Jay Lovestone, Sidney Hook, Arthur Koestler and so on, former communists. Is there any evidence of former Islamists now playing a role in this war of ideas against their erstwhile comrades?

MR. HAQQANI: Eric, do you want to take this question?

MR. BROWN: The first one, certainly in the UK and in Western Europe in general the schools for training imams are largely run or dominated either by the Brotherhood or by the Jama'at, and that's a real problem, particularly if you accept the fact that these guys don't always accept Western laws being something that they should adhere to. In fact, it was the rector of the European Institute of Human Sciences who said that we are trying to create authentic Muslims, authentic Islam, people that can teach authentic Islam. He said at the same time that we're trying to teach people how to follow the rules of the republic and he also admitted – confessed – it was very interesting – he said it's not always possible.

This is a problem waiting to happen. As far as Islamists breaking ranks, there's some evidence of this happening. But I tend to think that God, or what people believe is God's will for

them, has a way of inspiring and commanding the hearts of men and women in a way that Mao or Stalin or Hitler never could. The Brotherhood derive their inspiration from a view that they're doing God's work. God is eternal. A human tyrant is not.

There was actually a big debate that erupted about a year ago when Tariq Ramadan, a third generation of Islamist, He's of course Hassan al Banna's grandson as we all know. I'm surprised he hasn't been mentioned yet in this conference. (Laughter.)

It was probably deliberate. But Ramadan, not long back, basically wrote in English – not in Arabic—that the Islamic state wasn't a possibility anymore. And he also said that Muslims could suspend the hudud punishments. This led a whole bunch of Brotherhood activists from the European Council, as well as those based here in the United States, to condemn Ramadan, basically almost calling him an apostate, which is an interesting little intra-Islamist discussion which developed and could mean things for the future.

I should say that Ramadan is worrisome to me because he tries to claim not only the mantle of Hassan al Banna, but also Mohammed Abduh, the first Salafist thinker whose ideas, I believe, hold potential for an alternative Salafism that is not defined by the Brotherhood and that could potentially be consistent with liberal democracy. But I think that the fact that Ramadan has claimed to be the heir of Abduh forecloses upon that potential pathway of reform, or at least takes it momentarily out of play.

MR. HAQQANI: Now, I think that we may not be able to evict the Muslim Brotherhood from the West in any short time, but the Mayflower Hotel certainly will evict us from the room at a fixed time. (Laughter.)

So I think we have had a wonderful day of a lot of thought-provoking material being discussed, and this of course will continue to be something that all of us will be engaged with. Thank you all for coming on behalf of Hillel Fradkin and the Hudson Institute and the Center for the Future of Islamic World. I thank you all and look forward to remaining engaged. (Applause.)

(END)